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Abstract 
We explore the pace of increase in returns to schooling during the transition from 
planning to market over time across a number of Central and Eastern European 
countries, Russia, and China.  We use metadata from 33 studies of 10 transition 
economies covering a period from 1975 through 2002.  Our empirical model is an 
attempt to account for cross-section and over-time variation in rates of return as a 
function of the timing, speed, and volatility of reform processes as well as estimation 
methods used and sample characteristics.  Our principal aim is to investigate the 
relative strength of two hypotheses:  (1) the speed of economic transformation from 
planning to market represent the relaxation of legal, regulatory, and institutional 
constraints on wage-setting behavior, leading directly to adjustment returns to schooling 
to market rates; 2) the rapid increase in returns to schooling during the early reform 
period reflects the ability of highly-educated individuals to respond to changing 
opportunities in a disequilibrium situation.  We find that both the speed of reforms and 
the degree of economic disequilibrium as reflected in macroeconomic volatility help to 
explain cross-country differences in the time paths of the returns to schooling.  We 
report the systematic effects of sample characteristics, estimation methods, and model 
specifications on estimated returns to schooling. 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the defining characteristics of economies operating under the Soviet, 
Central and Eastern European, and Chinese planning schemes in the post-World War II 
era was the imposition of wage “grids,” introduced to effect income leveling policies that 
were, at least officially, favored by the communist government of the Soviet Union and 
which were adopted in various forms in the Soviet satellites and by China as well. 
(Meng, 2000; Munich, Terrell, and Svejnar, 2003).  The wage compression imposed by 
the grids effectively reduced private returns to schooling as conventionally measured.  
Estimated returns prior to reform were less than 5% in all countries except Hungary, 
which operated under a considerably less rigid economic regime than did most of the 
rest of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  In China, returns to 
schooling, which were in the 5-6% range in the early 1950s, fell to nearly zero by the 
end of the Cultural Revolution (Fleisher and Wang, 2003). 
With economic reforms, enterprises began to operate under fewer constraints, 
rapidly in most cases, but slower in China and in some of the countries that had been in 
the Soviet Union sphere of influence.  In the absence of the wage-grid structure, it is 
natural to expect that returns to schooling would increase.  While this expectation has to 
a large extent been fulfilled, the time path of returns to schooling has by no means been 
uniform.  Studies of the returns to schooling in much of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Russia (CEER) indicate they tended to rise almost immediately following reform, albeit 
at different speeds.  However, most studies of returns to schooling in China in the 
period covering approximately the first 15 years of its economic transition report low 
rates of return when compared not only to industrialized and industrializing countries but 
also to almost all of CEER.
2  This paper seeks an explanation of variation in the growth 
of returns to schooling within the CEER group as well as the larger variation between 
CEER and China. 
The path of returns to schooling in transition economies has generally evolved in 
two phases (Sabirianova Peter, 2003).  The early phase encompassed the period in 
                                            
2 For summaries of the estimated returns to schooling in China, see Zhang and Zhao (2002) and Fleisher 
and Wang (2003).  The reviews of the estimated rates of return in CEER countries are provided in 
numerous studies, including Boeri and Terrell (2002), Brainerd (1998), Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell 
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which the transition economies moved from wage setting under the wage grids toward 
one that reflected the relative marginal products of skilled and unskilled workers.  In the 
second phase the path of relative wages is expected to match more closely the path of 
relative marginal products of skilled and unskilled (or highly educated and less 
educated) workers.  This paper deals primarily with wage adjustments during the initial, 
disequilibrium phase of economic transition in CEER and China. 
One obvious hypothesis explaining wage adjustments during the first phase is 
that the speed of relative wage adjustment to the ratio of the marginal products simply 
reflects the speed of relaxation of legal, regulatory, and institutional constraints on 
wage-setting behavior.  Thus, the higher the speed of reforms the faster should returns 
to schooling be adjusted to the market rates. Another hypothesis explaining the 
relatively rapid increase in returns to schooling in CEER is that the structural 
transformations, disruptions, and economic disequilibrium are important factors, and the 
rapid increase in returns to schooling during the first phase reflects the ability of highly-
educated individuals to respond to changing opportunities in a disequilibrium situation 
(Schultz, 1975).  The two hypotheses – “the speed of reforms” and “disequilibrium” – 
are not mutually exclusive, and we compare their relative importance with metadata 
from 33 studies of 10 transition economies, linking these data to a rich set of measures 
on reform progress and macroeconomic volatility. 
Throughout the paper, we define the beginning of reform on the basis of political, 
legislative, and administrative changes that indicate a departure from the intent to 
control the economy according to an official plan, allowing or encouraging evolution 
toward a market economy. These dates are closely associated with the beginning of 
comprehensive price and trade liberalization programs in CEER and the year following 
the end of the Cultural Revolution in China.
3 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we describe 
metadata on returns to schooling in transition economies.  In section 3 we discuss 
various measures of the speed of reforms and macroeconomic volatility.  In section 4 
we present an empirical model with which we attempt to account for cross-section and 
                                            
3 The start of reforms is determined as follows:  1979 for China, 1990 for Hungary and Poland, 1991 for 
the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia, and 1992 for Estonia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.   3
over-time variation in rates of return as a function of reform processes (timing, speed, 
and volatility), estimation methods used, and sample characteristics.  Section 5 reports 
empirical findings and section 6 provides the summary of results. 
 
2.  Metadata on Returns to Schooling in Transition Economies 
In this paper, we use meta-analysis that integrates the results of several studies 
of the returns to schooling in transition economies.
4  We have created a unique data set 
of 470 different returns to schooling obtained from 33 studies in 10 transition 
economies.
5    
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for this sample of studies.  The full listing 
of 33 studies is reported in Appendix 1.  Returns to schooling in our sample of studies 
are mainly estimated by the OLS method.  Only 12.3 percent of the estimates are 
obtained by IV/2SLS or GMM methods, which is likely due to the lack of valid 
instruments in many data sets on transition economies.  Most estimates are obtained 
directly from the coefficients on the years of schooling; only 5.3 percent of the estimates 
are imputed on the base of specifications with the level of education.  Imputations are 
performed for countries with no direct estimates of the returns to the year of schooling, 
such as Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia.  72.7 percent of all studies report standard 
errors or t-statistics of the coefficient on the years of schooling. 
Besides traditional covariates such as years of schooling and linear and 
quadratic terms of experience, many earnings functions include additional individual 
characteristics that might affect the estimated returns to schooling.  In our sample, the 
industry of employment is included as a regressor in 39.8 percent of the estimates.  
Firm characteristics, such as size, age, and ownership, are included in 24 percent of the 
estimates.  Having occupational dummies in the earnings functions is less common 
                                            
4 For a meta-analysis of returns to schooling in a large sample of countries, see Ashenfelter, Harmon, and 
Oosterbeek (1999) and Denny, Harmon, and Lydon (2002).  Only the latter study includes transition 
countries, but the estimates of the returns to schooling are not time-varying. 
5 The original number of estimates exceeds 500 but for the purpose of our analysis, we had to exclude 
countries with no time trend in returns to schooling.  Among excluded countries are Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Vietnam, and countries of Central Asia.  We also excluded three outliers:  Li and Zhang (1998) reported 
 (-0.067) in 1977 for a very small sample of 668 workers from one China village; Li and Luo (2002) 
reported extremely high estimates of 0.326 and 0.356 for China in 1995 also for a very small sample of 
590 Chinese women.   4
(14.5 percent).  Only a few estimates control for hours of work (14.3 percent) using 
either hourly wage rate on the left-hand side or including log of hours on the right-hand 
side of the earnings function.  No hourly data have been used in the pre-reform period, 
but over time these data are increasingly becoming more available in the transition 
countries. Occasionally, earnings functions control for ethnicity, party membership, 
school quality, language, marital status, parental income, health, and family 
background.  Compared to the common use of the ability controls in many U.S. studies, 
we did not find any study in transition economies that explicitly control for ability 
measures (see Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek, 1999). 
Sample size varies significantly, with the largest samples coming from 
administrative data and the smallest samples being drawn in the pre-reform period in 
China and Russia.  The samples are mainly based on household surveys, with 7 
percent derived from surveys of employers or from administrative data.  Roughly half of 
the estimates are based on combined samples of men and women, with the other half 
based on gender-specific samples. 
Table 2 reports average returns to schooling for 10 countries by year from 1975 
through 2002.  Between 1 and 8 countries are represented in each year.  A substantial 
number of estimates come from the early 90s.  The overall trend of returns to schooling 
is positive, with a noticeable increase in the mean and variance of the returns to 
schooling over time.  Although the time path of returns to schooling has generally been 
upward as expected, it has not been uniform across countries or steady within countries 
over time.  This heterogeneity of levels and time paths is revealed in Table 3.  Initial 
reform years are indicated in column 1.  In the countries’ respective pre-reform periods, 
schooling rates ranged from a low of 1.5 percent in China to a high of 6.7 percent in 
Hungary, a country which did not adhere to the strict model of Soviet planning.  The 
estimated returns to schooling under communist wage grids were much below typical 
estimates for a market economy.
6  During the early reform period, defined as the first 
five years in Table 3, schooling returns barely budged in China, but rose sharply in the 
other countries for which comparisons can be made. The only exception in CEER is 
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using recent U.S. data are well above the estimates we report for the pre-transition period.   5
Hungary, where the returns were much higher prior to reform than in the other planned 
economies.  Some variation is noticeable in the time paths of rates of return among the 
CEER countries, particularly between low-return countries (such as Romania and 
Ukraine) and other CEER countries.  However, the biggest gap in the first phase is 
between the CEER group on one hand and China on the other.
7 
 
3.  Returns to Schooling, the Speed of Reforms, and Macroeconomic 
Disequilibrium 
Our central question is to what extent cross-country variation in the growth of 
returns to schooling in transition economies can be explained by the speed of market 
reforms and/or by the degree of macroeconomic volatility during the early reform period. 
A fundamental methodological question is the need to define reform progress. 
We measure reform progress in four broad dimensions:  liberalization of prices and 
wages, private ownership, enterprise reforms, and the openness of the economy.  We 
employ quantitative measures such as the proportion of GDP produced in the private 
sector and the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in GDP as well as qualitative 
indices developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
such as the degree of price and trade liberalization, large-scale privatization, and 
enterprise restructuring.  Definitions of all reform measures and data sources are 
reported in Appendix 2.  The EBRD indices are available for all Central and Eastern 
European countries and Russia for 1991-2002.  To extend the series, we have asked 
experts’ opinions on the indices for the pre-reform period and for China.  Additionally, 
we have developed our own index of wage liberalization to assess the countries’ 
departure from the wage grid towards market-based wage determination.
8  All reform 
indicators range from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating little or no change from rigid central 
planning and 4 indicating the level of reform is consistent with a well-functioning market 
economy. 
                                            
7 The gap in returns to schooling between China and Russia will appear somewhat smaller if we use 
1987, the beginning of Gorbachev’s gradual economic reforms (“perestroika”), as the start of Russian 
reforms. 
8 The index of wage liberalization is constructed on the base of experts’ opinions and documented 
institutional changes in the labor market.   6
Table 4 contains several measures of the speed of reforms in CEER and China 
in the early reform period.  In addition to the end-period values, we also show the 
change in reform measures during the first five years of transition.  Overall results 
suggest that after five years from the start of transition, all CEER countries in our 
sample became essentially market economies, with free prices and wages, open foreign 
trade, almost completed large-scale privatization, and the significant share of the private 
sector in GDP.  However, the “big bang” reform that describes much of CEER has not 
characterized China, where the Chinese Communist Party has retained political power 
throughout the economic transition.  The Chinese approach to transition has been aptly 
described as “growing out of the plan,” by Barry Naughton (1995) and by Deng 
Xiaoping’s phrase, “crossing the river by groping for stones” (Qian and Wu, 2003).   
Several years into the reform era, China not only had a much less liberal price, wage, 
and foreign trade regimes than did any of the CEER countries, but it also exhibited the 
smallest increase in the degree of liberalization, except for Slovenia, which had far less 
rigidly controlled prices to begin with.  After five years of reforms, China had hardly 
begun the privatization process and enterprise reforms.  An important illustration of slow 
enterprise reforms is the persistence of soft budget constraints in state owned 
enterprises until well into the 1990s, almost 20 years after the end of the Cultural 
Revolution (Appleton, et al, 2002). 
In contrast to China, all CEER countries in our sample moved very fast in the 
liberalization of prices, wages, and foreign trade; however, there are significant 
differences in the speed of privatization and enterprise reforms within the CEER group.  
For example, EBRD ranked privatization results in Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine very 
low compared to other countries in the region.  Romania, Russia, and Ukraine still 
retained soft budget constraints and weak enforcement of bankruptcy legislation well 
into the reform period, whereas others undertook significant actions to harden budget 
constraints and promote corporate governance effectively. 
In contrast to its relatively very slow movement toward free markets, China 
experienced the most rapid economic growth among the transition economies we 
examine.  Table 5 contains data on real GDP growth and real wage growth over the first 
five reform years in 10 transition economies.  The five-year real GDP growth rates   7
range from a low of approximately -52.8 percent in Ukraine to a high of 47.8 percent in 
China.  It appears clear that China experienced the largest real GDP growth and real 
wage growth during the first five transition years, and that real wages declined in all 
CEER countries except Hungary. 
Table 5 also illustrates that the loss of macroeconomic control as the fraction of 
total output produced under Plan diminished was much more severe in CEER than in 
China.  In China, where the early transition was furthest from the “big bang” approach, 
inflation was the mildest of all countries represented.  In contrast, every CEER country 
experienced significant inflation during the early reform period.  All other measures of 
macroeconomic volatility (the standard deviations of real GDP growth, real wage 
growth, and consumer inflation over the early reform period) also indicate less volatility 
in China than in the other countries, with one exception: the standard deviation of real 
wage growth was smallest in Hungary. 
The variation in the volatility of economic development across countries and 
between the European-Russian group and China is a strong candidate to explain cross-
country differences in returns to schooling in the early reform period.  According to the 
Shultz hypothesis, the rapid increase in returns to schooling could reflect the ability of 
highly-educated individuals to exploit opportunities that emerge in periods of 
disequilibrium.  In the transition context, however, testing this hypothesis is complicated 
by the fact that the period of disequilibrium is coincided with the period of market 
formation and with the adjustment of schooling returns to market rates. Thus, a major 
challenge is to disentangle the “speed effect” from the “disequilibrium effect” on the 
returns to schooling. 
4.  A Model of Cross-Country Differences in Returns to Schooling 
In this section, we present an empirical model that provides a framework for 
explaining the cross-country and over-time variation in returns to schooling in terms of 
differences in the speed of reforms and volatility of economic change.  We first specify a 
baseline equation for the returns to schooling as a function of reform timing, methods of 
estimation, specifications of the earnings functions, and sample characteristics: 
it it it it i it it it it it it S P M C TL TE r ε γ γ γ α τ α τ α τ α α + + + + + + + + = 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 0  (1)   8
where rit represents the estimates of the returns to schooling for country i and year t; the 
C’s denote the set of country dummy variables, TEit is the early transition period defined 
as the first five years since the reforms started
9, TLit is the late transition period, τit is 
time trend relative to the country-specific reform starting point (τit=1 at the beginning of 
reforms), and εit is an error term with i.i.d. properties and E(ε)=0.  Other variables control 
for the methods of estimation (Mit), the specifications of the estimated earnings 
functions (Pit), and sample characteristics (Sit).
10 
The baseline equation enables us to compare trends in returns to schooling 
between pre-reform, early, and late transition periods; and to identify the extent to which 
alternative estimation methods, model specifications, and different sample 
characteristics systematically affect estimates of the returns to schooling.  The 
estimated coefficients of the country dummy variables will reveal if there are ceteris 
paribus significant cross-country differences in the average returns to schooling.  We 
estimate the baseline equation by regular (unweighted) OLS and by using weighting 
techniques, with estimates of returns to schooling with smaller standard errors and 
derived from large samples receiving proportionately larger weights (see Denny, 
Harmon, and Lydon, 2002). 
The extended model is specified to provide information on factors that can 
account for cross-country differences revealed in the baseline estimates.  In the first 
extension, we add various measures of reform progress and macroeconomic volatility 
as follows. 
it it it it
it it i it it it it it it
S P M
Z X C TL TE r
ε γ γ γ
α α α τ α τ α τ α α
+ + +
+ + + + + + + =
3 2 1
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
 (2) 
where  Xit is a vector of variables that reflect countries’ progress towards a market 
economy and Zit is a vector of variables measuring macroeconomic volatility.  Since 
many of these variables (Xit and Zit) are highly correlated with each other, we employ 
                                            
9 We have also used alternative definitions of the early reform period as the first three and four years 
since the beginning of reforms.  Our results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
10 Mit include dummies for non-OLS estimation and imputed estimates from the coefficients on the type of 
education;  Pit is a set of dummy variables indicating whether estimated earnings functions include 
industries, occupations, firm characteristics, and hours of work; Sit is a vector of controls for household- 
and employer-based samples and gender-specific samples.   9
alternative specifications that include at least one measure of reform progress and one 
measure of macroeconomic volatility. We hypothesize that there is a positive 
association of the returns to schooling with the progress of economic reform and with 
economic volatility, ceteris paribus. 
  Our measures of reform progress (or market development) are cumulative in 
their nature and reflect not only the state of reforms in any given point of time but also 
changes accumulated over the past pre-reform and reform years.  Thus, these may not 
measure the speed of reforms for the countries characterized by “market socialism” 
which were already partially liberalized before the transition started (e.g. Hungary and 
Slovenia).  In a further extension of the baseline model, we distinguish between the 
effects of initial conditions and the effects of the speed of reforms on the returns to 
schooling.
11 
it it it it
it i i it it it it it it
S P M
Z X X TL TE r
ε γ γ γ
α α α τ α τ α τ α α
+ + +
+ + ∆ + + + + + =
3 2 1
6 5 5 0 4 3 2 1 0
 (3) 
where Xi0 is a vector of initial conditions and ∆Xi5 is a vector of the speed of reforms 
variables.  Using the same measures of reform progress as in equation (2), we modify 
them to reflect the speed of reforms, using the difference between the value of market 
development index in the fifth year of reforms (Xi5) and the value of market development 
index in the last year of the old system (Xi0). 
  5.  Estimation Results 
  Both OLS and weighted least square estimates of the baseline regression are 
reported in Table 6.  There are no principal differences between the two sets of 
estimated coefficients.  Unless otherwise indicated, the remaining discussion is based 
on the OLS estimates with country fixed effects, and all estimated coefficients meet 
customary significance standards.  On average, rates of return increased by 0.2 
percentage points per year during the respective countries’ planning periods; by 0.5 
percentage points per year during early reform,  and by 0.3 percentage points during 
late reform.  Thus, returns to schooling are estimated to have the highest rate of growth 
                                            
11 By including country dummies in Eq.2, we control for initial conditions, but the effect of initial conditions 
is not directly observable.   10
during the early period of the transition to a market economy.  Even after controlling for 
reform timing, methods of estimation, the specifications of the estimated earnings 
functions, and sample characteristics, cross-country differences in return to schooling 
remain significant, with China and Ukraine having lowest rates.  Estimates reported in 
studies where years of schooling are imputed are marginally smaller.  When occupation 
is included, estimated returns to schooling are considerably smaller for well-known 
reasons.  Including industry of employment and firm characteristics such as size, age, 
and ownership  has no statistically significant effect on the  estimated returns to 
schooling.  When earnings data are adjusted for hours worked, estimated returns to 
schooling are not significantly larger, which is somewhat surprising, given the analysis 
of Schultz (1988).  Estimates based on all-men samples are somewhat smaller, and 
those based on all-women samples are somewhat larger, than those in which both 
genders are represented in the data, which is consistent with studies from the U.S. and 
other countries (see Dougherty, 2003). 
  The largest “effect” on estimated returns to schooling is estimation by non-OLS, 
mainly instrumental variables techniques, and when the sample is employer based 
rather than worker based.  We take both of these results to imply that measurement and 
recall errors are important in schooling data, that employer data are more accurate than 
worker recollection in measuring years of schooling, and that the omission of “ability” 
measures from most studies does not dominate other sources of bias in OLS 
estimation. 
  The regressions reported in Table 7 represent an attempt to account for the 
cross-country differences in the rate of return to schooling by adding to the benchmark 
regression, one at a time, seven alternative measures of the speed of economic reform 
and seven alternative measures of macroeconomic volatility.  The definitions of all these 
measures are presented in Appendix 2.  Our hypotheses are that the level and speed of 
reforms represent the relaxation of legal, regulatory, and institutional constraints on 
wage-setting behavior, leading directly to adjustment returns to schooling to market 
rates, while macroeconomic volatility increases the payoff to schooling in the sense 
described by Schultz (1975).  Adding the speed of reforms and volatility variables to the 
benchmark equation is a significant step toward explaining the pattern of rates of return   11
during reform.  All coefficients on the speed of reforms and macroeconomic volatility 
variables are of the expected signs and are statistically significant.  When the speed of 
reforms and volatility variables are added to the baseline regression, the F-statistic for 
the joint significance of the time variables falls by nearly one-half.  Adding the speed of 
reforms and volatility variables also substantially reduces the F-statistic of the joint 
country effect.  For the baseline regression reported in column (1) of Table 6, the F-
statistic for significance of the country dummies as a group is 45.77.  But in Table 7 it 
falls to 23.31-37.92 depending on specification. 
Another way to assess the explanatory power of the speed of reforms and 
volatility variables is to use the estimated coefficients to project the impact of a unit 
change in the value of a regressor on the dependent variable.  Given the arbitrary 
nature of the units of measurement of the regressors, we use one standard deviation as 
the unit.  The estimated coefficient of privatization as measured by the private share of 
GDP implies that a one standard deviation increase in the private sector share leads to 
a 0.53 percentage point increase in the return to schooling, cet. par.  Using the 
estimated coefficients reported in column (2) of Table 7, an increase in the index of 
wage liberalization by one standard deviation is associated with an 0.45 percentage 
point increase in the rate of return to schooling, while an increase in mean inflation by 
one standard deviation is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the return 
to schooling.  Our findings are not conclusive about the relative strength of the two 
hypotheses.  The impact of both reform index and volatility variables on the estimated 
returns to schooling is significant but their relative power depends on the chosen 
measure. 
  A complementary approach to investigate the factors associated with cross-
country differences in return-to-schooling estimates is reported in Table 8, where we 
focus on the state of the respective economies at the beginning of reform.  Here we 
drop the country dummies and replace them with the initial levels of the reform variables 
used in the regressions of Table 7 as well as their change over the first five reform   12
years.
12  All coefficients on the speed of reforms variables are statistically significant 
and have expected positive sign.  The effect of the speed of reforms measured as the 5-
year difference is consistent with the earlier estimates where the speed of reforms is 
measured as the attained level of market reform progress.  An important finding is that 
initial conditions have substantial effect on the estimated returns to schooling:  the 
higher the level of liberalization at the start of reforms, the higher the returns.  Countries 
with less administrative regulations of wages and prices during the planning period are 
estimated to have higher schooling returns.  The volatility variables have the same signs 
as in Table 7, with the exception of the standard deviation of real GDP growth that 
switches the sign and becomes statistically insignificant. 
6.  Summary 
This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of studies of the returns to 
schooling in several Central and Eastern European countries, Russia, and China.  The 
data are the estimation results reported in 33 studies of 10 transition economies.  We 
develop an empirical model which permits us to account for cross-section and over-time 
variation in rates of return as a function of the timing, speed, and volatility of transition 
from planning to market as well as estimation methods used and sample characteristics.  
We find that both the speed of economic transformation from planning to market and the 
degree of economic disequilibrium as reflected in macroeconomic volatility help to 
explain differences in the increase in the rate of return to schooling over time and 
across countries.  Evaluating the relative explanatory power of the speed and 
disequilibrium hypotheses is complicated by their interaction and the fact that the 
transition to a market economy necessarily generates disequilibrium.  Nevertheless, as 
the correlations in Appendix Table A3 indicate, measures of transition speed and 
disequilibrium are by no means perfectly correlated, and we have been able to identify 
independent effects of these two forces. 
  The effect of sample characteristics and estimation technique is for the most part 
consistent with the results of other meta-studies of returns to schooling.  It is noteworthy 
                                            
12 Alternatively, we calculated the speed of reforms as the total number of years required to achieve a 
given level of market development.  We chose to not report the results because they are roughly similar 
to the ones presented in Table 8.   13
that larger estimated returns to schooling are obtained by non-OLS, mainly instrumental 
variables techniques and when the sample is employer based rather than worker based.  
We take both of these results to imply that measurement and recall errors are important 
in schooling data, that employer data are more accurate than worker recollection in 
measuring years of schooling and that the omission of “ability” measures from most 
studies does not dominate other sources of bias in OLS estimation. 
    Although the explanatory power of country dummy variables and of trend is 
significantly reduced when the speed of reforms and volatility variables are incorporated 
in the regression equations, their regression coefficients remain statistically significant.  
Thus, much remains to be learned.  We did not explore the role of technological change 
and the effect of supply shifts on returns to schooling.  We also have ignored the role of 
worker mobility in promoting changes in relative wages.  It is likely that these forces act 
differently in China than in CEER.  The answers to these and related questions await 
further study. 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of the Metadata on Returns to Schooling 
Metadata Characteristics  All 
Pre-
Reform 
Period 
Reform 
Period 
Observations      
Number  of  countries  10 9 10 
Number of studies  32  15  32 
Number of estimates  470  82  388 
     
Methods of estimations     
Non-OLS estimation  0.123  0.098  0.129 
Imputed values  0.053  0.073  0.049 
     
Specifications of the earnings functions     
Industry of employment included  0.398  0.415  0.394 
Occupation included  0.145  0.073  0.160 
Firm characteristics included  0.243  0.122  0.268 
Adjusted for hours  0.143  0.000  0.173 
      
Sample characteristics     
Sample of men and women  0.500  0.390  0.523 
Men sample  0.268  0.317  0.258 
Women sample   0.232  0.293  0.219 
Employer-based sample  0.070  0.049  0.075 
Household-based sample  0.930  0.951  0.925 
      
 
Notes:   The start of reforms is given as:  1979 for China, 1990 for Hungary and Poland, 1991 for the 
Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia, 1992 for Estonia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.   15
Table 2:  Average Returns to Schooling in Transition Economies 
Year Mean  Std.  dev.  No. of 
Countries 
No. of 
Studies 
No. of 
Estimates 
1975  0.016  0.003  1 1 9 
1978  0.014  0.002  1 1 9 
1981  0.025  0.000  1 1 1 
1984 0.030 0.010  3  2  17 
1985 0.029 0.016  2  3  10 
1986 0.038 0.013  4  5  13 
1987 0.038 0.008  3  5  14 
1988 0.040 0.009  3  6  20 
1989 0.046 0.017  5  7  15 
1990 0.045 0.009  3  3  14 
1991 0.046 0.011  5  7  35 
1992 0.057 0.020  6  12  35 
1993 0.054 0.011  7  7  29 
1994 0.064 0.020  7  9  43 
1995 0.086 0.035  8  11  38 
1996 0.075 0.018  7  12  37 
1997 0.070 0.029  6  5  21 
1998 0.075 0.024  5  6  27 
1999 0.076 0.036  3  3  16 
2000 0.088 0.037  5  5  42 
2001 0.078 0.027  2  2  17 
2002  0.062  0.025  1 1 8 
Total 0.060 0.030  10  32  470 
   16
Table 3:  Returns to Schooling and Reform Starting Points 
Country 
Reform 
Starting 
Point 
Pre-Reform 
Period 
Early Reform 
Period 
Late Reform 
Period 
China 1979  0.015  0.025  0.061 
   (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.033) 
Czech Republic  1991  0.039  0.070  0.083 
   (0.010)  (0.026)  (0.029) 
Estonia 1992  0.025  0.076  na 
   (0.000)  (0.009)   
Hungary 1990  0.067  0.074  0.098 
   (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
Poland 1990  0.046  0.067  0.072 
   (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Romania 1992  na  0.046  0.056 
     (0.015)  (0.023) 
Russia 1992  0.039  0.075  0.092 
   (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
 1987  0.029  0.043  0.081 
   (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.015) 
Slovak Republic  1991  0.038  0.061  0.097 
   (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.023) 
Slovenia 1991  0.043  0.063  0.070 
   (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Ukraine 1992  0.040  na  0.055 
   (0.014)    (0.022) 
 1987  0.033  0.047  0.055 
   (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
 
Notes:   N=470.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Early reform period is defined as first five 
years of reforms.  The reform starting point is defined as the beginning of comprehensive price and trade 
liberalization programs in CEER and the year following the end of Cultural Revolution in China.  For 
Russia and Ukraine we also consider an alternative starting point: beginning of “perestroika” or gradual 
economic reforms in 1987.    17
Table 4:  Measures of the Speed of Reforms during the Early Reform Period 
Liberalization of 
 
Wages Prices  Foreign 
Trade  
Large-
Scale 
Privati 
zation 
Enterprise 
Reforms 
FDI 
( % GDP)
Private 
Sector 
Share 
 of GDP 
End of Period            
China 1.3  1.3  1.3  1  1  0.28  0.02 
Czech Republic  4  3  4  4  3  4.93  0.70 
Estonia 4  3  4  4  3  3.45  0.70 
Hungary  4  3 4.3  3  3 2.76  0.55 
Poland 3  3  4  3  3  1.85  0.55 
Romania 3  3  3  2.7  2  0.79  0.55 
Russia 4  3  4  3  2  0.62  0.60 
Slovak Republic  3.7  3  4  3  3  1.23  0.60 
Slovenia 3  3  4  2.7  2.7  0.80  0.50 
Ukraine 3  3  3  2  2  1.17  0.50 
5-Year  Change            
China 0.3  0  0  0  0  0.28  0.02 
Czech Republic  3  2  3  3  2  4.72  0.58 
Estonia 2  1  2  3  2  3.45  0.60 
Hungary  1  1 1.3  2  1 2.12  0.40 
Poland 2  2  3  2  2  1.83  0.26 
Romania 1  1  2  1  1  0.65  0.30 
Russia 2  2  3  2  1  0.62  0.55 
Slovak Republic  2.7  2  3  2  2  1.23  0.48 
Slovenia 1  0  1  1.7  1.7  0.77  0.39 
Ukraine 1  2  2  1  1  1.17  0.40 
 
Sources:  EBRD Transition Reports (various issues), 2003 World Development Indicators; UNCTAD; national 
statistical yearbooks. 
 
Notes:  Definitions of all measures are reported in Appendix 2.  Early reform period is defined as first five years of 
reforms.     18
Table 5:  Macroeconomic Performance during the Early Reform Period 
5-Year Cumulative Change  Annual Standard Deviation 
Country  Real GDP 
Growth  Inflation  Real Wage 
Growth 
Real GDP 
Growth  Inflation  Real Wage 
Growth 
China  47.8  16.7 15.1 2.1 2.4 3.3 
Czech  Republic -4.7  152.2 -1.4  6.5 20.2 15.3 
Estonia  -23.6  5134.7 -35.7 10.7  460.7 23.7 
Hungary  -15.7  209.5 1.8 5.5 6.3 1.8 
Poland -3.4  2887.3 -28.4  6.1  242.2  12.2 
Romania 7.9  4704.4 -10.4  6.3  100.2  13.1 
Russia -37.0  322430.7 -55.3  4.9  691.3  21.5 
Slovak Republic  -15.3  171.8 -19.2  9.2 21.7 15.0 
Slovenia  -2.8  1107.2 -8.8  6.5 83.0 13.1 
Ukraine -52.8  5389377.0 -48.9 5.4  1883.4  24.3 
 
Sources:  2003 World Development Indicators, IMF, and national statistical yearbooks. 
 
Notes:  Early reform period is defined as first five years of reforms.  The start of reforms is given as:  
1979 for China, 1990 for Hungary and Poland, 1991 for the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia, 
and 1992 for Estonia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.   19
Table 6:  Returns to Schooling in Early and Late Reform Periods, Fixed Effects 
Variables 
(1) 
Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Error 
(2) 
Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Error 
  Unweighted OLS  Weighted OLS 
Constant 0.041
a 0.003  0.040
a 0.003 
Time 0.002
a 0.001  0.003
a 0.001 
Time*TE 0.003
a 0.001  0.002
c 0.001 
Time*TL 0.001
c 0.001  0.001  0.001 
Non-OLS estimation  0.043
a 0.004  0.044
a 0.003 
Imputed values  -0.006
c 0.003  -0.005
c 0.003 
Industry included  -0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002 
Occupation included  -0.018
a 0.002  -0.016
a 0.002 
Firm characteristics included  -0.003  0.002  -0.004
c 0.002 
Adjusted for hours  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.003 
Men sample  -0.008
a 0.002  -0.007
a 0.002 
Women sample   0.009
a 0.002  0.008
a 0.002 
Sample of employers  0.017
a 0.004  0.019
a 0.004 
Countries        
China  -0.026
a 0.003  -0.031
a 0.003 
Czech Republic  0.010
a 0.003  0.012
a 0.003 
Estonia  0.027
a 0.008  0.027
a 0.008 
Hungary  0.021
a 0.005  0.022
a 0.004 
Poland  0.015
a 0.004  0.016
a 0.003 
Russia  0.015
a 0.003  0.015
a 0.003 
Slovak Republic  0.002 0.004  0.001  0.004 
Slovenia  0.015
a 0.005  0.015
a 0.004 
Ukraine -0.030
a 0.004  -0.027
a 0.004 
F-test for 3 time variables  145.72  139.65 
F-test for 10 country dummies  45.77 54.07 
N  470 470 
R-squared  0.793  0.887 
 
Notes:  
a–significant at 1%; 
b–significant at 5%; 
c–significant at 10%.  (1) Basic regression. (2) Weighted 
regression – weights are given by the standard error of the estimate of the returns of schooling.  TE=early 
transition period defined as first five years since the start of reforms; TL=late transition period.  Time=time 
trend relative to the country-specific reform starting point (Time=1 at the beginning of reforms).   20
Table 7:  Returns to Schooling, the Speed of Reforms, and Macroeconomic 
Volatility, Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Private Sector 
Share of GDP 
Liberalization 
of Wages 
Liberalization 
of Prices 
Foreign Trade
Liberalization
Large-Scale 
Privatization 
Enterprise 
Reforms 
FDI Share of 
GDP 
0.021
a 0.004
a 0.004
c 0.002
c 0.003
a 0.007
a 0.002
a 
Speed of 
Reforms 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean 
(Real GDP 
Growth) 
Mean 
(Inflation) 
Mean 
(Real Wage 
Growth) 
Annual 
Inflation 
Std.dev.  
(Real GDP 
Growth) 
Std.dev. 
(Annual 
Inflation) 
Std.dev. 
(Real Wage 
Growth) 
-0.077
b 0.001
b -0.099
a 0.002
a 0.189
a 0.002
a 0.058
a 
Volatility 
/100 
(0.036) (0.001) (0.024)  (0.001) (0.046) (0.001) (0.021) 
Time  /100  0.091 0.054 0.113
c 0.107 0.069 0.147
b 0.139
b 
  (0.064) (0.072) (0.064)  (0.073) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) 
Time*TE 0.002
c 0.002
b 0.001  0.003
a 0.003
a 0.000  0.002 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Time*TL 0.002
b 0.002
a 0.002
b 0.002
b 0.002
a 0.001  0.001
c 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.037
a 0.031
a 0.033
a 0.032
a 0.026
a 0.033
a 0.036
a 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
F-test for 
3 time 
variables 
60.83 65.68 23.18 84.42 66.36 86.09 44.67 
F-test for 
10 country 
dummies 
25.36 35.18 32.40 37.19 35.51 23.31 37.92 
N  466 470 470 470 470 470 470 
R
2  0.802 0.798 0.805 0.797 0.802 0.804 0.799 
Changes in Returns to Schooling 
Speed of 
Reforms 
Private Sector 
Share of GDP 
Liberalization 
of Wages 
Liberalization 
of Prices 
Foreign Trade 
Liberalization
Large-Scale 
Privatization 
Enterprise 
Reforms 
FDI Share of 
GDP 
 0.0053  0.0045  0.0031  0.0025  0.0031 0.0054 0.0030 
         
Volatility 
/100 
Mean 
 (Real GDP 
Growth) 
Mean 
(Inflation) 
Mean 
(Real Wage 
Growth) 
Annual 
Inflation 
Std.dev.   
(Real GDP 
Growth) 
Std.dev. 
(Inflation) 
Std.dev. 
(Real Wage 
Growth) 
  -0.0013 0.0022 -0.0053 0.0016 0.0105 0.0029 0.0032 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
a–significant at 1%; 
b–significant at 5%; 
c–significant at 10%.  
The dependent variable is returns to schooling.  All specifications include the same set of variables as in Table 6, 
including country fixed effects.  Changes in returns to schooling show changes in the mean value of returns to 
schooling in response to one standard deviation increase in the corresponding measure of the speed of reforms and 
volatility.  TE=early transition period defined as first five years since the start of reforms; TL=late transition period.  
Time=time trend relative to the country-specific reform starting point (Time=1 at the beginning of reforms).  Means 
and standard deviations are calculated over three periods.   21
 Table 8:  Returns to Schooling, Initial Conditions, and the Speed of Reforms 
 
  Private Sector 
Share of GDP 
Liberalization 
of Wages 
Liberalization 
of Prices 
Foreign Trade 
Liberalization
Large-Scale 
Privatization 
Enterprise 
Reforms 
FDI Share of 
GDP 
0.044
a 0.010
a 0.014
a 0.016
a 0.012
a 0.026
a 0.048
a  Initial 
Conditions (0.011)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
0.046
a 0.015
a 0.010
a* 0.013
a 0.016
a 0.017
a 0.003
a  5-year 
Difference (0.007)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Mean 
 (Real GDP 
Growth) 
Mean 
(Inflation) 
Mean 
(Real Wage 
Growth) 
Annual 
Inflation 
Std.dev.   
(Real GDP 
Growth) 
Std.dev. 
(Inflation) 
Std.dev. 
(Real Wage 
Growth) 
-0.044 0.002
a -0.216
a 0.003
a -0.026  0.004
a 0.130
a  Volatility 
/100 (0.036)  (0.001)  (0.024)  (0.001) (0.057) (0.000) (0.023) 
N  470 470 470 470 470 470 470 
R
2  0.693 0.726 0.713 0.735 0.730 0.712 0.675 
 
Notes:  Returns to schooling is the dependent variable.  All specifications include the same set of variables as in 
Table 6, except for country fixed effects.  Means and standard deviations are calculated over three periods.   22
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Appendix 1:  Sources of Metadata 
Study Year  Country  Published 
1. Brainerd    1998  Russia  published 
2.  Byron and Manaloto   1990  China  published 
3.  Campos and Julliffe   2002  Hungary  WP* 
4.  Chase   1998  Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
published 
5.  Earle, Sapatoru and 
Trandafir 
2002 Romania  WP 
6.  Filer et al.   1999  Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
published 
7.  Flanagan   1998  Czech Republic   published 
8.  Giles et al   2003  China  WP 
9. Gorodnichenko  2004  Ukraine  calculations 
10. Gregory and Meng   1995  China  published 
11. Heckman and Li   2003  China  WP 
12. Jamison and Van Der Gaag   1987  China  published 
13. Johnson and Chow   1997  China  published 
14. Keane and Prasad   2002  Poland  WP 
15. Kollo  2003  Hungary  calculations 
16. Li   2003  China  published 
17. Li and Luo   2002  China  published 
18. Liu   1998  China  published 
19. Maurer-Fazio   1999  China  published 
20. Meng and Kidd   1997  China  published 
21. Munich et al.   1999  Czech Republic   published 
22. Noorkoiv et al   1997  Estonia  WP 
23. Orazem and Vodopivec   1997  Slovenia  published 
24. Rutkowski   1996  Poland  published 
25. Rutkowski   1997  Poland  published 
26. Rutkowski   2001  Poland  WP 
27. Sabirianova  2004  Russia  calculations 
28. Varga and Galasi  2002  Hungary  WP 
29. Vecernik   2001  Czech Republic   published 
30. Vodopivec   2002  Slovenia  WP 
31. Wang  2004  China  calculations 
32. Wu and Xie   2002  China  WP 
33. Zhang and Zhao  2002  China  WP 
 
*WP=working paper.   27
Appendix 2:  Definitions and Data Sources 
Index of Price Liberalization 
1  Most prices formally controlled by the government; 
2  Price controls for several important product categories; state procurement at non-
market prices remain substantial; 
3  Substantial progress on price liberalization: state procurement at non-market prices 
largely phased out; 
4  Comprehensive price liberalization; utility pricing which reflects economic costs. 
 
Source:  EBRD, Transition Report (various issues) and country experts’ assessments. 
Index of Foreign Trade Liberalization 
1  Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign 
exchange; 
2  Some liberalization of import and/or export controls; almost full current account 
convertibility in principle but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully 
transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates); 
3  Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; 
almost full current account convertibility; 
4  Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart 
from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in 
exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-
uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full current 
account convertibility. 
 
Source:  EBRD, Transition Report (various issues) and country experts’ assessments. 
Index of Large-Scale Privatization 
1  Little private ownership; 
2  Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed; 
3  More than 25% of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of 
being privatized but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate 
governance; 
4  More than 50% of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and 
significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises. 
 
Source:  EBRD, Transition Report (various issues) and country experts’ assessments. 
Index of Governance and Enterprise Restructuring 
1  Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline 
at the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance; 
2  Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy but weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate 
governance;   28
3  Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote 
corporate governance effectively (e.g. through privatization combined with tight 
credit and subsidy policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation); 
4  Substantial improvement in corporate governance, for example, an account of an 
active corporate control market; significant new investment at the enterprise level. 
 
Source:  EBRD, Transition Report (various issues) and country experts’ assessments. 
Index of Wage Liberalization 
1  Most wages formally set up by the government through the wage grid; 
2  Attempts of wage liberalization; government sets up wages in some sectors of the 
economy; enterprises are given some autonomy on determining wages; 
3  Substantial progress on wage liberalization; some wage regulation still remains (e.g. 
taxes on excessive wage bills); 
4  Removal of almost all government regulation of wages (apart from minimum wages). 
 
Source:  Country experts’ assessments. 
Private Sector Share of GDP (%) 
The private sector share of GDP represents rough EBRD estimates, based on available 
statistics from both official and unofficial sources.  The private sector value added 
includes income generated by the activity of private registered companies as well as by 
private entities engaged in informal activity in those cases where reliable information on 
informal activity is available.  In China, we use the non-state non-collective share of 
urban employment.  This is the only consistent series that we found for 1973-2001.   
 
Sources:  EBRD, Transition Report (various issues) and China Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
Share of FDI Net Flows of GDP (%) 
FDI is defined as net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor.  It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.   
 
Sources:  World Bank, World Development Indicators; national statistical publications and the UNCTAD 
database. 
 
Annual GDP Growth (%) 
Annual GDP growth (%) is measured as annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 
1995 U.S. dollars.  
 
Sources: IMF and World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Annual Inflation (%)  
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and   29
services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used.  
 
Sources: IMF; World Bank, World Development Indicators; ILO, national statistical publications; and 
EBRD, Transition Report (various issues). 
 
Annual Real Wage Growth (%)  
Real wage index is calculated from the nominal wage index and CPI.  Nominal wages 
are taken from national statistical yearbooks. 
 
Sources: IMF; World Bank, World Development Indicators; ILO, national statistical publications; and 
EBRD, Transition Report (various issues).   30
Appendix Table A3:  Correlation Coefficients between  
the Speed of Reforms and Macroeconomic Volatility 
 
  Liberalization of 
 
Wages  Prices  Foreign 
Trade  
Large-
Scale 
Privati 
zation 
Enterprise
Reforms 
Private 
Sector 
Share 
 of GDP
FDI 
( % GDP)
All Period          
Annual  Inflation  0.061 -0.092 -0.106 -0.129 -0.172  -0.095 -0.130 
Annual Real GDP Growth  -0.163  -0.002  -0.031  0.138  0.123  0.034  0.197 
Annual  Real  Wage  Growth  0.003 0.051 0.058 0.160 0.191  0.134 0.152 
Mean  (Inflation)  0.110  0.014 -0.057 -0.086 -0.138  0.006 -0.168 
Mean  (Real  GDP  Growth)  -0.259 -0.046 -0.136 -0.023  0.011  -0.120  0.197 
Mean  (Real  Wage  Growth)  -0.122 -0.054 -0.071 -0.038  0.053  -0.082  0.205 
Std.dev  (Inflation)  0.105 -0.004 -0.067 -0.093 -0.123  -0.001 -0.156 
Std.dev (Real GDP Growth)  0.259  0.204  0.152  0.036  0.084  0.020  -0.061 
Std.dev (Real Wage Growth)  0.242  0.188  0.070  0.022  -0.059  0.114  -0.189 
Pre-Reform Period          
Annual  Inflation  0.182 0.642 0.520 0.183  -0.108  0.428 0.016 
Annual  Real  GDP  Growth  -0.425 -0.347 -0.189 -0.436 -0.007  -0.403 -0.114 
Annual  Real  Wage  Growth  0.069 -0.250 -0.163 -0.208  0.127  -0.202 -0.041 
Mean  (Inflation)  0.217 0.634 0.525 0.119  -0.128  0.269  -0.037 
Mean  (Real  GDP  Growth)  -0.394 -0.311 -0.137 -0.496  0.018  -0.497 -0.061 
Mean  (Real  Wage  Growth)  0.024 -0.085  0.130 -0.663  0.113  -0.412 -0.064 
Std.dev  (Inflation)  0.221 0.578 0.520  -0.053  -0.157  0.140  -0.085 
Std.dev (Real GDP Growth)  0.165  0.052  -0.038  0.157  -0.282  -0.373  -0.178 
Std.dev (Real Wage Growth)  0.279  0.507  0.317  0.434  -0.136  0.435  -0.001 
Early Reform Period          
Annual  Inflation  0.027 -0.417 -0.435 -0.270 -0.380  -0.236 -0.235 
Annual  Real  GDP  Growth  -0.226  -0.028 0.195 0.313 0.303  0.157 0.137 
Annual  Real  Wage  Growth  0.003 0.161 0.305 0.375 0.323  0.320 0.258 
Mean  (Inflation)  0.117 -0.244 -0.419 -0.144 -0.327  0.032 -0.254 
Mean  (Real  GDP  Growth)  -0.565 -0.202 -0.055 -0.187 -0.064  -0.357 -0.060 
Mean (Real Wage Growth)  -0.359  -0.169  0.051  -0.182  0.096  -0.327  0.217 
Std.dev  (Inflation)  0.120 -0.256 -0.420 -0.143 -0.285  0.040 -0.204 
Std.dev  (Real  GDP  Growth) 0.605 0.508 0.556 0.403 0.604  0.509 0.440 
Std.dev (Real Wage Growth)  0.381  0.152  -0.004  0.215  0.041  0.367  -0.042 
Late Reform Period          
Annual  Inflation  0.082 0.047 0.085 0.034  -0.171  0.113  -0.030 
Annual  Real  GDP  Growth  -0.578 -0.419 -0.565 -0.503 -0.379  -0.611 -0.124 
Annual  Real  Wage  Growth  -0.186 -0.038 -0.184 -0.177  0.042  -0.176 -0.050 
Mean  (Inflation)  0.127 0.123 0.158 0.068  -0.124  0.196  -0.078 
Mean  (Real  GDP  Growth)  -0.741 -0.501 -0.721 -0.674 -0.390  -0.782 -0.113 
Mean  (Real  Wage  Growth)  -0.475 -0.352 -0.509 -0.481 -0.214  -0.566  0.027 
Std.dev  (Inflation)  0.028 -0.001 -0.028 -0.060 -0.263  0.067 -0.122 
Std.dev  (Real  GDP  Growth)  0.072 -0.242 -0.453 -0.186 -0.440  -0.112 -0.121 
Std.dev  (Real  Wage  Growth) 0.147 -0.102 -0.297 -0.123 -0.401  0.023 -0.312 
 
Notes:  N=157 for country-year observations.  Means and standard deviations are calculated over three periods.  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  6/14/04 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 703: Return to Skills and the Speed of Reforms: Evidence from 
Central and Eastern Europe, China and Russia 
Belton M. Fleisher, Klara 
Sabirianova Peter, and Xiaojun 
Wang 
June 2004 
No. 702: What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, 
Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania 
J. David Brown, John S. Earle 
and Dana Lup 
May 2004 
No. 701: The Effects of Multiple Minimum Wages Throughout the 
Labor Market 
T. H. Gindling and Katherine 
Terrell 
May 2004 
No. 700: Minimum Wages, Inequality and Globalization  T. H. Gindling and Katherine 
Terrell 
May 2004 
No. 699: Self-Selection and Earnings During Volatile Transition  Ralitza Dimova and Ira Gang  May 2004 
No. 698: Ecology and Violence: The Environmental Dimensions of War  Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. 
Schipani 
May 2004 
No. 697: Russian Cities in Transition: The Impact of Market Forces in 
the 1990s 
Ira N. Gang and Robert C. Stuart  May 2004 
No. 696: Firm Ownership and Internal Labor Practices in a Transition 
Economy: An Exploration of Worker Skill Acquisition in Vietnam 
Jed Friedman  May 2004 
No. 695: The Unanticipated Effects of Insider Trading Regulation  Art A. Durnev and Amrita S. 
Nain 
May 2004 
No. 694: Volatile Interest Rates, Volatile Crime Rates: A New 
Argument for Interest Rate Smoothing 
Garett Jones and Ali M. Kutan  May 2004 
No. 693 Money Market Liquidity under Currency Board – Empirical 
Investigations for Bulgaria 
Petar Chobanov and Nikolay 
Nenovsky 
May 2004 
No. 692: Credibility and Adjustment: Gold Standards Versus Currency 
Boards 
Jean Baptiste Desquilbet and 
Nikolay Nenovsky 
May 2004 
No. 691: Impact of Cross-listing on Local Stock Returns: Case of 
Russian ADRs 
Elena Smirnova  May 2004 
No. 690: Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and State  
Ownership in China:Evidence from New Panel Data 
Takao Kato and Cheryl Long  May 2004 
No. 689: Diverging Paths: Transition in the Presence of the Informal 
Sector 
Maxim Bouev  May 2004 
No. 688: What Causes Bank Asset Substitution in Kazakhstan? 
Explaining Dollarization in a Transition Economy 
Sharon Eicher  May 2004 
No. 687: Financial Sector Returns and Creditor Moral Hazard: Evidence 
from Indonesia, Korea and Thailand 
Ayse Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
May 2004 
No. 686: Instability in Exchange Rates of the World Leading 
Currencies: Implications of a Spatial Competition Model 
Dirk Engelmann, Jan Hanousek 
and Evzen Kocenda 
May 2004 
No. 685: Spinoffs, Privatization, and Corporate Performance in 
Emerging Markets 
Jan Svejnar, Evzen Kocenda and 
Jan Hanousekf 
May 2004 
No. 684: CPI Bias and Real Living Standards in Russia During the 
Transition 
John Gibson, Steven Stillman and 
Trinh Le 
May 2004 
No. 683: Mission Implausible III: Measuring the Informal Sector in a 
Transition Economy using Macro Methods 
Jan Hanousek and Filip Palda  May 2004 
No. 682: The Other Side of the Moon: The Data Problem in Analyzing 
Growth Determinants 
Jan Hanousek, Dana Hajkova and 
Randall K. Filer 
May 2004 
No. 681: Consumers' Opinion of Inflation Bias Due to Quality 
Improvements 
Jan Hanousek and Randall K. 
Filer 
May 2004 
No. 680: IMF-Related Announcements, Fundamentals, and Creditor  
Moral Hazard: A Case Study of Indonesia 
Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
May 2004 
No. 679: Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition Countries  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan and 
Paul Wachtel 
Apr. 2004 
No. 678: Does Market Liberalisation Reduce Gender Discrimination? 
Econometric Evidence from Hungary, 1986—1998 
Dean Jolliffe and Nauro F. 
Campos 
Apr. 2004 
 